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In 2002, Bostrom and Felbinger presented a novel quantum secure direct communication protocol (named
often as ping-pong protocol) [1] with a security proof in the case of ideal quantum channel. In this paper,
we will show that the security proof is wrong in the strict sense.
To prove the security of their protocol, Bostrom and Felbinger assume that Eve adds an ancilla in the
state |χ〉 and performs a unitary operation Eˆ on the composite system consisting of the travel qubit and
the ancilla. Then they worked out the von-Neumann entropy S of the state of the travel qubit after Eve’s
attack operation and after Alice’s encoding operation. Von-Neumann entropy S is taken as the maximal
amount I0 of classical information that can be extracted from a state. After some deductions, they got
function I0(d), where d is the detection probability for Eve’s attack. By analyzing I0(d), they conclude
that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. However, it should be emphasized that in Ref.[1]
the I0 is extracted from the travel-qubit state. This is clearly stated by Bostrom and Felbinger themselves
nearby the equation 8 in Ref.[1]. Incidentally, if the equations 7 and 8 in Ref.[1] denote the composite-
system state, then the calculation of S is wrong according to Ref.[2]. As will also lead to the fact that the
security proof is wrong.
About Bostrom and Felbinger’s proof, there exists a very serious question: Is it reasonable to assume in
priori that Eve extracts useful information only from the travel-qubit state and disregards the ancilla state
and the composite-system state? Only at a glance, one will answer no, because if the ancilla state and
the composite-system state are completely useless, then it is completely unnecessary for Eve to introduce
an ancilla. Now let us extensively analyze the above question. Relative to the proof, especially to the
analysis of I0(d) in the proof, the question can be transformed into another one. That is, whether I0a
and I0c are always not greater than I0t for any d, where I0t, I0a and I0c denote the maximal amounts
of classical information extracted from the travel-qubit state, the ancilla state and the composite-system
state, respectively. If the answer is yes, then the priori assumption is of course reasonable, because the
analysis of I0t(d) is enough for security proof. Otherwise, Bostrom and Felbinger’s proof will be quite
questionable. This is because I0a(d) and I0c(d) are not obtained and consequently one does not know
whether Eve can extract some useful information from the ancilla state or the composite-system state
and meanwhile faces zero detection probability. In this case, Bostrom and Felbinger’s security proof is
insufficient to support their conclusion that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. Of course,
the proof is unconvinced and one can say the security proof is wrong. Hence, now the key question is
that whether I0a and I0c are always not greater than I0t for any d. In fact, the key question can be easily
answered via a simple example. Suppose Bob sends |0〉 and the ancilla Eve adds is a qubit in the state
|χ〉 =
√
2
2
(|0〉+ |1〉). Then the state of the composite system consisting of the travel qubit and the auxiliary
qubit is |ξ〉 =
√
2
2
(|00〉+ |01〉). Assume that the unitary operation Eˆ Eve performs on the composite system
is Eˆ =
√
2
2
(|00〉〈00| − |00〉〈10|+ |01〉〈01| − |01〉〈11|+ |10〉〈00|+ |10〉〈10|+ |11〉〈01|+ |11〉〈11|). In this case,
after Eve’s attack operation, the eavesdropping detection probability d is 1/2. Then after Alice’s encoding
operation, I0t = 1 and I0c = 2 can be easily worked out. Apparently, these two values satisfy Ref.[2]’s
conclusion (i.e., the completely mixed density operator in a n-dimensional space has entropy log
2
n). Since
I0c is obviously greater than I0t in the case of d = 1/2, of course, the proof’s priori requirement that I0a
and I0c are always not greater than I0t is denied. Hence, whether Eve can extract some useful information
2from the composite-system state in the case of d = 0 becomes an unsolved question. Accordingly, Bostrom
and Felbinger’s conclusion that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected is cursory. In the strict
sense, their so-called security proof of ping-pong protocol in Ref.[1] is wrong for it does not indeed indicate
that the ping-pong can not be eavesdropped in an ideal quantum channel. Incidentally, the recent work[3]
has already revealed that the ping-pong protocol can be eavesdropped even in an ideal quantum channel,
as strongly supports the conclusion of this paper.
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